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Markets and Securities Services |

United Kingdom

58

Angela Burns

8

The regulator’s case against Angela Burns

was that she had behaved improperly in her

activities as a non-executive director. The

Decision Notice proposed a financial penalty

of GBP154,800, along with a prohibition

order to prevent Burns from carrying on any

function in relation to any regulated activity

(an absolute prohibition). The Tribunal upheld

or partly upheld four allegations against

Burns but dismissed six of them. The Tribunal

found that Burns was in breach of Statement

of Principle 1 (integrity) and that she was not

a fit and proper person to carry out the non-

executive director (CF2) function.

Despite the findings of the Tribunal, the

regulator continued to argue for the financial

penalty of GBP154,800 and the absolute

prohibition order. The Tribunal said:

In our judgment the Authority did not make

a realistic reassessment of the position

in the light of the fact that six out of its

ten allegations failed and, out of the four

which succeeded, three were upheld to only

a limited extent. We find the Authority’s

submissions to be unsatisfactory and

unpersuasive in a number of respects . . . In

the circumstances, we find ourselves in

wholesale disagreement with the Authority’s

assessment of the level of seriousness of

the proven breaches, and accordingly with

the level of financial penalty arrived at by

the Authority. Furthermore, the Authority’s

contention that it would be appropriate

to prohibit Ms Burns from carrying out

any function in relation to any regulated

activity rests on a more negative view of her

conduct than that taken by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal considered that the appropriate

financial penalty was GBP20,000. A

prohibition order was imposed, but it only

prevented Burns from acting as a non-

executive director.

At the time of writing, Burns is in the process

of taking further legal action in her case.

John Pottage

9

Pottage was the CEO of two subsidiaries

of UBS. The FSA wanted to impose a

financial penalty on him of GBP100,000

because it was alleged he had “failed to

take reasonable steps to ensure that the

business of the firm complied with the

requirements of the regulatory system”.

The two UBS companies were separately

fined GBP8 million for failing to prevent

four employees posting unauthorised

trading losses to customer accounts.

The case against Pottage related to the

period when he first became the CEO and

what he had done on his appointment.

The FSA said he had failed to carry out an

effective “initial assessment” of the business

as would be expected of a new CEO. It also

said he had not questioned effectively

assurances that he was given by others, nor

had he carried out continuous monitoring

in particular to consider adequately the

wider implications for governance and risk

management of a series of warning signals.

It was alleged he had also not begun early

enough a systematic overhaul of the systems

and controls in place in the business.

The Tribunal, however, considered the

various activities that Pottage had done

on appointment and concluded that they

were the adequate actions of a new CEO,

concluding, “The FSA has not satisfied

us . . . from the evidence as a whole that Mr

Pottage’s standard of conduct was ‘below

that which would be reasonable in all the

circumstances’ (see APER 3.1.4G) . . . Put

positively, we think that the actions that

Mr Pottage in fact took prior to July 2007

to deal with the operational and compliance

issues as they arose were reasonable steps”.

Senior management liability and

a separate enforcer

The TSC and the PCBS were concerned about

the failure of the FSA enforcement regime to

discipline bankers in the wake of the financial

crisis and expect the system to generate

more such cases in future. Indeed, the new

senior manager regime is designed to make

it easier for such persons to be targeted. The

existence of statements of responsibility and

responsibilities maps will enable regulators

to work through the fog that frequently

surrounds organisation charts in large

corporate entities.

It is obviously important that the enforcement

regime should function effectively in

dealing with cases when they are brought