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Global Trustee and Fiduciary Services News and Views

| Issue 47 | 2017

55

the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

was created in 2008 to protect consumers,

while in the UK, the former single regulator,

the Financial Services Authority, has been

broken into separate regulators — the

Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and

the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) —

with the aim of sharpening the minds of

each regulatory body to ensure that both

prudential and conduct forms of regulation

would receive sufficient attention.

The review of reviews into HBOS

There may be yet more structural change

to come in the UK. The TSC’s July paper,

Review of the Reports into the Failure of

HBOS, amounted to a literature review of

the various reports already published on

HBOS’s collapse, though the TSC did take

some new evidence of its own.

1

The TSC pointed to earlier concerns about

the coordination between the supervision

and the enforcement functions inside what

was then the FSA. HM Treasury (HMT)

undertook a review into enforcement

in December 2014

2

that “accepted that

there was the potential for a degree of

tension between the two functions”.

However, HMT “argued that cooperation

between supervision and enforcement

was likely to be ‘imperilled’, not improved,

by separation”.

The regulators at the time said that they

supported the HMT’s conclusions that

enforcement and supervision functions

should continue within the regulatory

bodies themselves. Sir Brian Pomeroy, then

a non-executive director at the FCA, was

quoted as saying that there was a trade-off

between “coordination, a free exchange of

information and independence”.

The TSC concluded that the question of enforcement separation should be looked at again. Three reasons were put forward for this:

The collapse of HBOS was a

prudential failing. Yet, the bulk

of enforcement staff sits within

the FCA. An independent

enforcement function “could

and should sit equidistant

between the PRA and the FCA”.

A separate body would “bolster

the perception of the enforcement

function’s independence”. The

current system, in which the

same organisation supervises,

applies and prosecutes the law, “is

outdated and can be construed as

unfair”. Separation could “increase

confidence in the impartiality

of regulatory enforcement

decisions, and facilitate objective

scrutiny of supervisors’ actions by

enforcement staff”.

Separation would allow the

FCA, the PRA and the

enforcement body itself to be

clearer about their objectives.

Better accountability and

outcomes would follow.